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WAKE UP FANNIE, I THINK I GOT SOMETHING TO SAY TO 
YOU: FINANCING COMMUNITY LAND TRUST 
HOMEBUYERS WITHOUT STRIPPING AFFORDABILITY 
PROVISIONS† 
ABSTRACT 
Individual homeownership, the backdrop of the American Dream, is often 
cited as a panacea of economic and social stability.  Investment in and control 
over one’s “castle,” the story goes, creates neighborhoods and communities of 
involved, committed residents.  Besides providing a stable place to live, 
homeownership allegedly serves as an important element of wealth 
accumulation and its expansion, especially among marginalized populations, 
has been a major goal of economic and social policy for decades.  However, 
the recent foreclosure crisis and related economic collapse exposed 
vulnerabilities in the developed system of homeownership and mortgage 
financing—vulnerabilities so deep that they have left whole neighborhoods 
abandoned, and shaken economic stability across every income bracket.  As a 
result, some analysts have begun to seriously question the virtues of—and 
sometimes to blame—policies that incentivize homeownership for people who 
traditionally cannot afford it. 
This Comment presents an existing model of affordable homeownership 
that has weathered the housing collapse with astounding resilience: the 
Community Land Trust (CLT).  The CLT model aims to create community-
based, affordable housing available in perpetuity.  This Comment outlines the 
concepts and structures that underlie CLT affordability, exploring how the 
model operates within the context of American homeownership.  In particular, 
it examines the tensions between the CLT model and the mortgage industry, 
focusing on the crucial but often difficult process of obtaining CLT homebuyer 
financing.  Ultimately, the Comment suggests changes to the Fannie Mae CLT 
Uniform Mortgage Rider, an instrument originally developed to encourage 
lenders to loan money to CLT homebuyers, but which threatens the fabric of 
CLT resilience by stripping the model of its affordability provisions.  The 
proposed changes suggest that these provisions survive foreclosure, lending 
 
 † This Comment received the 2010 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and 
Writing. 
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stability to the CLT model and acknowledging the demonstrated resilience of 
CLT borrowers in the recent housing collapse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are two houses for sale on Pleasant Street in Williamstown, 
Vermont.  They both have roughly the same square footage.1  Both are painted 
white with red shutters, have two-car garages, and sit on grassy, tree-lined 
lots.2  One house has a list price of $243,000.3  The other will cost a buyer 
anywhere between $110,000 and $185,000, depending on her income and the 
number of people in her household.4  In a town where the average family could 
afford to pay approximately $160,000 for a home (with an $11,000 down 
payment),5 the price difference between the two Pleasant Street properties is 
significant.  The price, however, is not the only difference.  One of the 
homes—the less expensive one—rests in the stewardship of the Central 
Vermont Community Land Trust (CVCLT), “an affordable housing 
organization [based] on the community land trust model.”6  Whoever 
purchases this house on Pleasant Street will enter into a unique property 
relationship with CVCLT: she will purchase the structure, while CVCLT will 
retain title to the grassy, tree-lined lawn, which it will lease to her through a 
ninety-nine year, renewable ground lease.  The house on Pleasant Street, along 
with over 6,000 other homes nationwide,7 rests under the wing of the 
Community Land Trust (CLT) model for affordable housing—a model that 
removes the cost of land from the price of homeownership, and aims to keep 
that price affordable in perpetuity. 
CLTs have developed in the United States alongside a growing need for 
affordable housing.8  For years, the widening gap between stagnant incomes 
and the rising cost of homes excluded increasing numbers of people from the 
 
 1 Compare Condominiums, CENT. VT. COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www.cvclt.org/homes_for_ 
sale.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (on file with author), with Williamstown Vermont Real Estate, BERG, 
CARMOLLI & KENT REAL ESTATE, http://www.bckrealestate.com/proddir/prod/12/5771 (last visited May 14, 
2010) (on file with author). 
 2 See sources cited supra note 1. 
 3 BERG, CARMOLLI & KENT REAL ESTATE, supra note 1. 
 4 CENT. VT. COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, supra note 1. 
 5 WILLIAMSTOWN TOWN PLAN DRAFT 36 (2010), available at http://www.williamstownvt.org/Docs/ 
2010_TownPlan_Sec1-6.pdf. 
 6 About CVCLT, CENT. VT. COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www.cvclt.org/about_cvclt.html (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
 7 Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz & Rosalind Greenstein, A National Study of Community Land Trusts 16 
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP07YS1, 2007). 
 8 David M. Abromowitz, An Essay on Community Land Trusts: Toward Permanently Affordable 
Housing, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 213, 214 (C. 
Geisler & G. Daneker eds., 2000). 
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residential real estate market.9  In response to this crisis, federal and state 
governments, as well as nonprofit organizations, established programs to assist 
low-income people in their struggle for stable shelter.10  These programs often 
focus on lowering the monthly cost of housing without affecting the price of 
the unit itself as it passes from owner to owner.11  The CLT model assumes a 
different approach to affordable homeownership, crafting a strategy aimed at 
reducing the cost of the house, not just the monthly payment.12  CLT 
homeownership incorporates a “shared equity” element, wherein the 
homebuyer agrees that upon reselling her home she will sell it to another low-
income buyer and limit the price she will charge according to a preset formula.  
Ultimately, the CLT represents a method of structuring legal property 
relationships: “[T]o provide access to land and housing to people who are 
otherwise denied access; to increase long-term community control of 
neighborhood resources; to empower residents through involvement and 
participation in the organization; and to preserve the affordability of housing 
permanently.”13 
In light of the recent housing crisis, analysts debate the value of 
homeownership as a goal for affordable housing programs.14  This Comment 
assumes that there is a place for homeownership in the spectrum of affordable 
housing and argues that CLTs present a viable model for sustainable, low-
income homeownership.  However, because ownership may not be for 
everyone, CLTs also incorporate affordable rental units into their portfolios.15  
In 2007, 45% of CLTs surveyed offered rental housing.16  Many of these CLTs 
 
 9 Julie Farrell Curtin & Lance Bocarsly, CLTs: A Growing Trend in Affordable Home Ownership, 17 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 367, 368 (2008). 
 10 See RICK JACOBUS & JEFFREY LUBELL, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, PRESERVATION OF AFFORDABLE 
HOMEOWNERSHIP: A CONTINUUM OF STRATEGIES 1–2 (2007), http://www.nhc.org/pdf/chp_se_strategies_ 
0407.pdf (discussing various affordable housing programs, focusing on homeownership and subsidy 
retention). 
 11 Id. at 3. 
 12 See Tim McKenzie, The Case for Plan B, SHELTERFORCE, Fall 2007, at 36, 37–39, available at 
http://www.shelterforce.org/article/637. 
 13 Overview, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php? 
fuseaction=Main.SectionHome&sectionID=2 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
 14 Joseph Williams, President Shifts Focus to Renting, Not Owning, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2009, at 1. 
 15 Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 17. 
 16 Id. at 2. 
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use their access to government subsidies and nonprofit, tax-exempt status to 
develop inexpensive rental units, sometimes at 30% below local market rates.17 
The CLT model has demonstrated exceptional resilience through the recent 
rash of nationwide foreclosures,18 and as a 2009 study reveals, efficiently 
retains and reuses the value of public subsidies over time.19  Despite the 
apparent success of the model, CLT homebuyers have faced difficulty securing 
mortgage financing.  As a condition of loaning on a CLT property, lenders—
backed by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”)—
require CLTs to agree to amend their model in a manner that threatens the 
strength of their long-term affordability.  Essentially, these amendments 
require that all affordability provisions terminate in the event of foreclosure, 
thrusting any and all risk associated with helping low-income individuals 
achieve homeownership onto the shoulders of the CLT. 
This Comment argues that rather than force CLTs to bear the risk of 
homebuyer financing by placing their affordability provisions on the chopping 
block, Fannie Mae—a government-sponsored enterprise charged with an 
obligation to work affirmatively toward the increase of low-income 
homeownership—should revise the language of its Uniform Rider to allow 
CLT affordability provisions to survive foreclosure.  Part I outlines CLT 
basics, describing how the model conceptually and structurally approaches its 
primary goal of long-term housing affordability.  This Part focuses on the 
particularities of place and community in which the CLT grounds its 
commitment to affordability, noting that each CLT must negotiate its own way 
through a landscape of ethical and social tensions to accomplish its goal.  
Following this discussion of conceptual and foundational underpinnings, Part I 
outlines how CLTs establish and enforce their commitment to long-term 
affordability in their legal and organizational structures. 
Having discussed the basics of CLT affordability in Part I, Part II focuses 
on the necessary and often difficult process of obtaining financing for a CLT 
homebuyer.20  This discussion (1) explores financial risk as an obstacle to CLT 
 
 17 Daniel Fireside, Community Land Trust Keeps Prices Affordable—For Now and Forever, YES! 
MAGAZINE, Fall 2008, at 28, available at http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/purple-america/community-land-
trust-keeps-prices-affordable-for-now-and-forever. 
 18 See discussion of foreclosure statistics infra notes 263–65 and accompanying text. 
 19 See discussion of Champlain Housing Trust twenty-year affordability audit infra notes 188–93 and 
accompanying text. 
 20 Although the development goals of the CLT itself, including land acquisition, construction, and 
organizational support, must also be financed, those issues are outside the scope of this paper. 
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homebuyer financing and (2) analyzes how the allocation of that risk threatens 
and thwarts CLT affordability.  Focusing on the Fannie Mae CLT Uniform 
Rider, this portion of the Comment argues that current solutions to homebuyer 
financing, while they may encourage lenders to loan money, gravely threaten 
the fabric of CLT affordability by stripping the model of its affordability 
provisions.  Finally, this Comment argues that in light of its affirmative duty to 
further affordable homeownership, and the demonstrated resilience of CLT 
borrowers against mortgage default, Fannie Mae should revise its Rider 
provisions to ensure that CLT affordability provisions survive foreclosure. 
I. THE NATURE OF A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST 
A recent nationwide study of existing CLTs revealed that 98% of the 105 
CLTs surveyed considered the development of affordable housing a primary 
function of their organization.21  This Part explores how the goal of perpetual 
affordability has shaped the CLT model, and how the model continues to 
incorporate affordability into its structure and operations.  Section A examines 
the historical development and contemporary status of the CLT commitment to 
affordability.  Section B discusses the “nuts and bolts” of affordability, 
examining where and how the CLT incorporates affordability into its 
organizational structures and legal relationships. 
A. Commitment to Affordability 
The CLT commitment to affordability is found and founded in the lore and 
legend of the CLT model—from its international origins, to its first American 
manifestation in the civil rights movement, and its current affiliation with 
municipal, state, and national housing relief efforts.22  First, this section 
examines the importance of land to CLT affordability.  Next, it investigates the 
many ways that the CLT conceives of and incorporates “community” into its 
role as a provider of perpetually affordable housing.  Finally, this section 
discusses tensions inherent in the CLT model, and outlines ways that CLTs 
 
 21 Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 24.  The survey included CLTs which provide open-
space preservation and land conservation, which may explain the 2 of 105 respondents who did not claim the 
provision of affordable housing as a major component of their work.  Id. 
 22 See, e.g., Julia Bartolf Milne, Will Alternative Forms of Common-Interest Communities Succeed with 
Municipal Involvement?  A Study of Community Land Trusts and Limited Equity Cooperatives, 38 REAL EST. 
L.J. 273, 288–92 (2009) (discussing the interaction between CLTs and municipalities, especially the City of 
Chicago). 
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negotiate their community commitment within the larger political, social, and 
economic framework. 
1. Long-Term Affordability in the Land 
One of the most interesting and effective elements of the CLT’s 
commitment to long-term housing affordability lies in the fact that the CLT has 
a physical location.  The first American CLT emerged in Albany, Georgia, 
during the late 1960s.23  Called “New Communities,” the project held the 
concept of long-term, stable access to land at its core.24  The New 
Communities project—led by Robert Swann, Slater King, and other activists—
grew out of the civil rights movement.  The project targeted the capture of over 
5,000 acres of land in rural Georgia by an independent nonprofit organization, 
which would hold them “in trust” for the perpetual use of rural farmers.25  The 
resident farmers would own their houses and other improvements to the land, 
but lease the land itself at low cost for a renewable period of ninety-nine 
years.26  The New Communities CLT model sought to remedy the disparity in 
control of land between classes and racial groups and aimed to offer a stable 
source of farmland to primarily African-American farmers, regardless of the 
fluctuating market value of land or farm goods.27  The model was designed to 
remove land from the speculative market and to protect farmer-residents from 
the instability of eviction or foreclosure suffered by poor tenants of more 
traditional rental- or mortgage-based models.28 
In 1972, Robert Swann and other members of the Institute for Community 
Economics (ICE)29 outlined the CLT model in their book, Community Land 
Trust: A Guide to a New Model of Land Tenure in America.30  The writers 
framed the CLT as a response to land maldistribution based on wealth and 
influence.31  The model drew inspiration and guidance from peaceful land 
reform movements across the globe, including the Gramdan movement in 
 
 23 Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 370–71. 
 24 ROBERT S. SWANN ET AL., INT’L INDEPENDENCE INST., THE COMMUNITY LAND TRUST: A GUIDE TO A 
NEW MODEL FOR LAND TENURE IN AMERICA, at ix (DRA of Vt. 2007) (1972). 
 25 Stewart E. Perry, Preface to SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at vii. 
 26 SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 62. 
 27 Id. at 3. 
 28 Id. at 18. 
 29 At the time, the Institute for Community Economics (ICE) operated under the name International 
Independence Institute. 
 30 JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, NAT’L HOUS. INST., SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE OF RESALE-RESTRICTED OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 21 (2006). 
 31 SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 1; Perry, supra note 25, at xv. 
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India, where land was given to villages as trustees with the purpose of granting 
land-use rights to individuals.32  The New Communities model also drew from 
the structure of the Jewish National Fund in Israel, an effort to bring security of 
land to small farmers and their families.33  The Jewish National Fund’s 
structure most directly parallels the CLT structure suggested in the guide.34 
The centrality of land access to housing availability seems almost too 
obvious to state, and yet many approaches to housing policy have not 
accounted for this necessity.35  In an article exploring the ethics of housing, 
Tim Iglesias argues that American housing policy is informed by a plurality of 
five ethical models.36  Iglesias acknowledges that courts and policymakers 
often approach housing as an economic good, and that this approach stands in 
“profound and persistent” tension with the goal of housing affordability.37  
Iglesias also notes that the CLT model of affordable housing conflicts with this 
“traditional expectation of housing as economic investment good.”38  He 
presents another ethic that approaches housing as “one land use in a functional 
system.”39  This ethic, which informs zoning ordinances and planning 
commissions, acknowledges the significance of land for housing but does not 
ensure that the land will be accessible to low-income individuals.40  The CLT 
structure fuses an understanding of housing as a necessary land use with an 
understanding that a “functional system” is one in which low-income 
individuals can access the allocated land. 
As demonstrated by the New Communities initiative, land hosts the 
community that can claim it, and the act of claiming land and determining its 
use stands at the core of CLT long-term affordability.  For example, in the 
 
 32 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 20. 
 33 SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 9−10. 
 34 Id. at 16–17. 
 35 Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 511, 511 (2007). 
 36 Id.  These models include “(1) housing as an economic good, (2) housing as home, (3) housing as a 
human right, (4) housing as providing social order, and (5) housing as one land use in a functional system.”  
Id. 
 37 Id. at 530. 
 38 Id. at 527. 
 39 Id. at 569–76.  Iglesias argues that this ethic is the most promising approach for the future of 
affordable housing because it leaves room for the mandatory inclusion of affordable housing without phrasing 
it in terms of redistribution.  Examples of this approach include movements for “workforce housing,” which 
argue for proximity of housing to employment for all income levels in a district.  The CLT model is 
compatible with this approach to housing policy and can be an effective way of preserving space for the 
purpose of “workforce housing.”  Id. at 592–93. 
 40 Id. at 585. 
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mid-1980s residents of Boston’s Roxbury neighborhood found themselves 
victims of widespread urban divestment.41  Under the motto “Take a Stand on 
the Land,” community members launched a campaign to revitalize their 
neighborhood called the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI).  After 
extensive grassroots planning, the community implemented a plan to redevelop 
the neighborhood.42  Community members, backed by the financial assistance 
from the City of Boston and foundational grants, spent thousands of volunteer 
hours cleaning up the neighborhood.43 
As the reality of urban recovery came into focus, DSNI planners realized 
that without somehow ensuring the land’s future affordability, the very 
community members who invested so heavily in the neighborhood 
revitalization could be priced out of the neighborhood by gentrification.44  It 
occurred to these leaders that the neighborhood’s increasing value would not 
be created by the market but rather by the community’s own efforts.  If the 
land were merely resold to individuals, that increased value would be allocated 
to the private pockets of people who may or may not have contributed to the 
revitalization effort.45  If, however, the land could somehow remain in 
community control, then the increased value could be preserved for community 
members, present and future, many of whom would not otherwise have the 
resources to access the value they helped create.  DSNI chose to allocate the 
value of the revitalized neighborhood to the community itself and formed 
Dudley Neighbors Incorporated, a CLT.46 
2. Long-Term Affordability in the Community 
As demonstrated by DSNI’s use of the CLT model to channel the benefits 
of neighborhood redevelopment back into the community, the CLT 
commitment to long-term affordability arises out of a commitment to 
community.  In addition to their primary function of fostering long-term 
affordable housing, many CLTs engage in other community-based activities, 
including homebuyer counseling, community gardening, and political 
 
 41 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 222. 
 42 The City of Boston granted the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative the power of eminent domain so 
that it could acquire vacant properties that impeded the development process.  Id. 
 43 See PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD 72–73 (1994). 
 44 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 223. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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advocacy.47  By offering stable, affordable housing options48 from within a 
community, CLTs become a center of gravity for other activities, weaving 
long-term affordable housing into the fabric of community development. 
The CLT is a “trust,” with beneficiaries who must sit at the center of 
organizational and management decisions.  The trustee–beneficiary 
relationship is at the heart of the CLT community concept and its method of 
providing long-term affordability.  The traditional CLT ownership model, in 
which ownership of the land and structure is divided between CLT and 
homeowner, lowers the cost of homeownership for each individual buyer.49  
This aspect of CLT affordability is similar to that of condominium 
associations,50 where the cost of common areas, amenities, and maintenance is 
shared among all owners, rendering the cost of housing lower than it would 
otherwise be if each owner separately owned equivalent property.  The CLT 
model, however, incorporates a broader understanding of shared ownership.  
The CLT board operates as a trustee and is formed with the express duty of 
preserving the affordability of its units for future homebuyers.51  The Uniform 
Condominium Act articulates this difference in its definition of person: 
“‘Person’ means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, 
partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision 
or agency, or other legal or commercial entity.  [In the case of a land trust, 
however, ‘person’ means the beneficiary of the trust rather than the trust or 
the trustee.]”52 
This definition illuminates a difference between control and trusteeship.53  
Although both the CLT and the Condominium Association serve as organized 
entities that govern residential property relationships, in the CLT the role of 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 For most CLTs, long-term affordable housing goals are realized through the classic CLT 
homeownership model.  However, other CLTs also host low-income rental options.  See, e.g., Sungu-Eryilmaz 
& Greenstein, supra note 7, at 2 (45% of responding CLTs reported to host rental units on their property). 
 49 Merely removing the value of the land from the cost of the structure does not ensure long-term 
affordability; however, it is an element of the CLT model that enables long-term affordability to be established 
in the ground lease.  See infra notes 124–78 and accompanying text. 
 50 Some CLTs also incorporate condominium units into their portfolio of homes.  JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, 
BURLINGTON ASSOCS. IN CMTY. DEV., STARTING A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST: ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
OPERATIONAL CHOICES 61 (2007), available at http://www.richmondhabitatclt.yolasite.com/resources/ 
Starting_a_CLT_Book_Format_Beneficiaries_Addition_0407.pdf. 
 51 Id. at 25–28. 
 52 UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(19) (1980) (emphasis added) (brackets in original). 
 53 See discussion of New Communities supra notes 25–34 and accompanying text. 
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trusteeship54 demands that the extent and substance of resident control remain 
in service of the larger circle of trust beneficiaries: the greater community—
present and future.55 
In addition to extending into the future, the CLT community reaches well 
outside of its formal property lines.  When forming a CLT, organizers work to 
incorporate fully the broader community into the goal of providing long-term 
housing.56  CLTs envision homeownership as an investment in stable access to 
shelter and thus community security.57  The model connects a web of 
stakeholders including CLT resident homeowners, other CLT residents (if 
any), all possible future CLT residents, the surrounding residential and 
business community, and the public at large.58  It is in consideration of this 
network of interests that the CLT holds its land for the purpose of providing 
low-income housing.59  In this way, the CLT model intertwines its members’ 
ownership interest with those of the surrounding community. 
3. Tensions in Long-Term Affordability 
A CLT’s commitment to ensuring long-term affordable housing, though 
firmly grounded in the land and community, floats amidst a series of tensions.  
First, the CLT faces a tension between the conventional concept of ownership 
as individual control over property and the concept of community trusteeship.60  
This tension arose even in the formation of New Communities, when its 
founders struggled to balance “the right of the individual user of land to control 
 
 54 In recent years, CLT advocates have used the term stewardship to express the role of the CLT in 
respect to preservation of affordable housing.  This Comment uses the term trusteeship here to set up the 
tension between trusteeship and control as discussed in New Model of Land Tenure for America.  See infra note 
60.  The CLT movement’s use of the term trusteeship probably originated from the Gramdan movement in 
India.  See History, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php? 
fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=30 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).  The reasoning behind the shift in 
terminology is unclear, but it appears as though it may be an attempt by CLT advocates to avoid invoking the 
legal connotations of the word trusteeship in situations where those duties would complicate CLT formation. 
 55 See John Emmeus Davis, Homes That Last, SHELTERFORCE, Winter 2008, at 18, 23, available at 
http://www.shelterforce.org/article/1237/homes_that_last. 
 56 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 50, at 38–43. 
 57 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. 
 58 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 25. 
 59 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 18. 
 60 See SWANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 26.  In the guide, the authors propose a binary model of property 
management where control referred to the ability of the land’s occupants to control the everyday operations 
while trusteeship described the separate duty of a group of people—some of whom may also live on the land 
trust—to ensure that the long-term goals of land access and affordability be implemented and maintained.  Id. 
at 26–30. 
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his life; and the need for a body . . . that can perform the long-range allocation 
function and ensure . . . the goals of the trust.”61  The founders of New 
Communities imagined that their target community would look upon 
trusteeship with skepticism: 
People who have never had a chance to own land . . . may very well 
reject the idea of a trusteeship over the land they expect to use.  
Members of minority groups who have been typically excluded from 
land ownership and often view it as the only way to gain control of 
both land and their own destinies, may see such a trusteeship as 
merely another exclusion.62 
Though perhaps smacking of paternalism, the New Communities concept of 
trusteeship promised the benefit of secured land tenure.63  However, unchecked 
by some aspect of resident control, trusteeship does little to ensure that a 
community will be able to tailor the terms of affordable, accessible land tenure 
to local needs as they arise. 
The principal question of resident control hinges on whether and to what 
extent the organizers of the CLT believe that CLT residents will be able to 
represent adequately the interests of future low-income residents as they make 
day-to-day decisions that could affect the affordability of CLT housing.  After 
years of evolution, the CLT model still grapples with the balance between 
resident control and stewardship.64  This tension challenges entrenched 
concepts of homeownership and property and stands at the heart of most policy 
debates over the CLT model.65 
Imbedded in the long-term goals of the CLT structure is a dialectic of 
value.66  CLTs understand homeownership as a means of secure land tenure, as 
opposed to a speculative investment opportunity.67  However, the relationship 
between the two is more complex than this dichotomy suggests.  A CLT’s goal 
of maintaining durable affordability68 pulls against the needs of a low-income 
 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 71–72. 
 65 See Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 234. 
 66 See Iglesias, supra note 35, at 527–28 (discussing the conflict between the CLT model and an ethic of 
housing as an economic good). 
 67 See Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. 
 68 Durable affordability is a term used to describe the set of policies that restrain the price of a CLT unit 
from buyer to buyer.  See RICK JACOBUS & RYAN SHERRIFF, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, BALANCING DURABLE 
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resident who, in order to relocate in a rising market, would need to realize 
some degree of return in her investment.69  These two goals are not mutually 
exclusive, and both inform the establishment of CLT resale restrictions.70  The 
CLT’s precise organizational structure will determine the process by which 
resale restrictions are calculated and can be amended.71  However, CLTs 
involve their membership (comprised of homeowners) in the amendment of 
resale restrictions.72  This ensures that homeowner concerns are considered in 
the formation of policies that govern investment return.  Therefore, the manner 
in which the CLT balances resident control and CLT stewardship73 will 
influence how the CLT balances durable affordability against an opportunity 
for wealth accumulation. 
Another tension that CLTs face arises when they choose which sector of 
the population they will aim to serve.74  For example, the Madison Area 
Community Land Trust describes itself as “a (501c) non profit organization 
seeking to promote affordable housing for first time home buyers at or below 
80% of Median income in the Madison and Dane County area.”75  This 
decision addresses the geographic and financial scope of the population for 
whom it would like to offer affordable housing.76  Geographically, a CLT must 
devise a service area such that it is both manageable and effective.77  
Financially, the CLT should target a population that is not only in need, but 
also to which it is financially possible to offer homeownership.78  Because the 
typical CLT model affords some level of voting rights to members,79 the 
 
AFFORDABILITY AND WEALTH CREATION: RESPONDING TO CONCERNS ABOUT SHARED EQUITY 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 (2009). 
 69 Id. at 10.  It is important to note that there are many reasons (beyond the need to relocate) why an 
element of wealth accumulation is not incompatible with the CLT model.  See id. at 11–13. 
 70 See discussion of resale formula infra notes 164–75 and accompanying text. 
 71 Resale restrictions are generally chosen by CLT organizers, but their amendment is provided for in the 
bylaws. 
 72 See discussion of resale formula amendment infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
 73 I have transitioned to using stewardship in place of trusteeship to reflect contemporary terminology.  
For a discussion of the relationship between the two words, see supra notes 54, 60. 
 74 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 25–28. 
 75 About the Madison Area CLT, MADISON AREA COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www. 
affordablehome.org/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
 76 CLTs might also determine eligibility for housing based on characteristics such as age, disability, and 
demonstrated need.  DAVIS, supra note 50, at 28. 
 77 Id. at 32–34. 
 78 Id. at 25–27. 
 79 Membership may include not only CLT residents, but also persons in the service area who choose to 
affiliate themselves with the CLT.  Id. at 70. 
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characteristics of its service population can have a direct effect on the 
operation of the CLT.80 
When navigating any of these tensions, a CLT must take into account the 
social, political, and economic climate within which it will operate.  In this 
way the CLT is often in tension with existing policies and institutions.  
Sometimes what seems like the best choice for the community conflicts with 
the qualifications for broader funding sources or greater political support.81  
The weight of these tensions varies within communities, and their resolution 
sculpts CLTs into fundamentally local creatures.  Any description of CLTs 
should acknowledge that the CLT model resembles a constellation of 
commitments and tendencies rather than a determined set of common, concrete 
features.82  This flexibility, while it allows a CLT to cater its policies to a 
community’s needs, complicates efforts to advocate for broad CLT-friendly 
policy because the legislative and regulative process generally requires great 
specificity.83 
B. The CLT Establishes Its Commitment to Affordability in Its Formal 
Structure 
When a CLT transforms from an idea born out of local need into a 
recognized organization, it establishes its commitment to long-term affordable 
housing in the rules and legal structures that define and regulate its operation.  
Through this process, each CLT negotiates the tensions that surround it, 
devising solutions that both respond to the particularities of its establishment 
and further the goal of long-term affordability.  The following discussion 
attempts to navigate the landscape of CLT tendencies without sacrificing the 
complexity and diversity that underlie the model.  This section discusses ways 
that CLTs have implemented and could implement goals of long-term housing 
affordability through the intentional use of organizational structure, legal 
relationships, and governing documents. 
 
 80 Id. at 25. 
 81 Id. at 28. 
 82 Id. at 1. 
 83 For example, in order for the Community Development Act of 1992 to make CLTs per se Community 
Development Housing Organizations (CDHOs), CLTs had to be defined.  The definition outlines certain 
characteristics of a CLT that may not apply in some scenarios, such as governing board composition.  42 
U.S.C. § 12773(f) (2006). 
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1. Long-Term Affordability Established in CLT Organizational Structure 
A classic CLT84 is set up as an independent, nonprofit corporation under 
the laws of the state in which it is formed.85  As an entity that provides 
affordable housing and other community services, CLTs typically apply for 
federal 501(c)(3)86 nonprofit, tax-exempt status early in their formation.87  
Nonprofit status qualifies CLTs for many forms of financial assistance beyond 
the benefit of tax exemption.88 
Because a CLT will need to attach copies of its articles of incorporation 
and bylaws to its application for 501(c)(3) status, CLT organizers need to 
prepare these documents early in the formalization process.89  Articles and 
bylaws outline, among other things, the requirements of CLT membership and 
the method for establishing a governing board.90  In the classic CLT model, 
members have considerable impact on the organization because they vote for 
and can serve on the CLT board.91  Thus, at an early point in formation, CLT 
organizers must address the tension between community control and the 
stewardship goals of the organization by specifying the parameters and powers 
of membership. 
The National CLT Network (NCLTN)92 lists “representative governance” 
as one of its core principles, defining it as the integration of “key stakeholders 
 
 84 I borrow the term classic from John Davis, a prominent and prolific CLT advocate, to discuss the most 
common forms of CLT legal and organizational structure.  DAVIS, supra note 50, at 1 (“Although there is 
much variation among the 200 CLTs already in existence or under development in the United States, there 
are . . . key features that are found in most of them.  These features . . . defin[e] and distinguish[] what may be 
called the ‘classic’ CLT . . . .”). 
 85 Id. at 1–2.  Generally, in cases where a CLT is not an independent nonprofit, it exists as a project of 
another nonprofit organization.  Id. 
 86 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 87 For details on this process and general tips for CLTs as they fill out the 501(c)(3) application, see ICE, 
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST LEGAL MANUAL § 6, at 1 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter ICE (Third)], available at 
http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=1614. 
 88 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 51 (“Any federal funds that are offered to nonprofit 501(c)(3) corporations for 
the construction of affordable housing . . . can be used—and have been used—by CLTs.”). 
 89 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 6, at 14. 
 90 Id. § 4, at 1. 
 91 ICE, COMMUNITY LAND TRUST LEGAL MANUAL § 5C, at 1–3 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter ICE 
(Second)], available at http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=1613. 
 92 The National Community Land Trust Network (NCLTN) formed in 2006 out of the Institute for 
Community Economics (itself a descendent of Robert Swann’s International Independence Institute).  NCLTN 
provides research and resources on the CLT model.  Who We Are, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST 
NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Main.SectionHome&sectionID=1 (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2010). 
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in the decision-making of the organization, particularly residents on 
community owned land.”93  The classic CLT model extends membership to 
persons residing anywhere within the CLT service area.94  For example, model 
language provided by ICE for classic CLT articles of incorporation outlines 
membership as: 
(a) The Initial Members . . . shall be those persons who have attended 
at least one “organizing meeting” . . . . 
(b) The Regular Members . . . shall be (1) the “Lessee Members,” 
who are all persons who lease land or housing from the Corporation 
or who lease or own housing located on land leased by another entity 
from the Corporation, and (2) the “Non-Lessee Members,” who are 
all other persons who qualify as Regular Members under the 
Bylaws.95 
Corresponding language from the ICE Model Bylaws further defines these 
categories: 
a. The Lessee Members . . . shall be all persons who lease land or 
housing from the Corporation or who lease or own housing that is 
located on land leased by another entity from the Corporation. 
b. The General Members . . . shall be all other persons, eighteen 
years of age or older, who have complied with the following 
requirements. 
(1) Submission of a Membership application . . . . 
(2) Payment of dues as established by the Membership . . . .96 
This language, although perhaps imprecise,97 demonstrates the scope of membership 
of a classic CLT. 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 5A, at 1. 
 95 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 4, at 10.  This language leaves ambiguity as to how many and which 
members of a lessee household count as Lessee Members.  More precise language appears in the bylaws of the 
Champlain Housing Trust (CHT): 
Resident Members shall include all members of any household living in property owned, in 
whole or in part or otherwise in stewardship with the Corporation, as described in Article V, who 
are aged 16 years or older.  This shall include single-family home-owners who lease land owned 
by the Corporation, owners of housing units who have granted BCLT or the Corporation a 
Housing Subsidy Covenant, tenants in rental units owned by the Corporation or by a limited 
partnership in which the Corporation, or any subsidiary of the Corporation has an ownership 
interest, and members of limited-equity housing cooperatives that have signed a Contract for 
Services with the Corporation or BCLT. 
Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. II, § 2 (2009) (on file with Champlain Housing Trust and author). 
 96 ICE (Third), § 5A, at 3. 
 97 See supra note 95. 
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Once CLT organizers establish a membership body, they write the bylaws 
to outline general operations.98  The bylaws govern the powers and duties of 
members; the composition, selection, and operation of the board of directors; 
and the establishment and amendment of fundamental pillars of the classic 
CLT, such as resale-restriction formulas and ground leases.99  The bylaws also 
outline a process for amendment, the back door through which great changes 
can occur. 
CLT bylaws serve as a procedural buffer to protect the stewardship goals of 
the CLT.  For example, ICE recommends that CLTs require a minimum of 
two-thirds vote by directors and members for an amendment to pass.100  The 
Champlain Housing Trust (CHT) Bylaws require a two-thirds vote by the 
board of directors, quorum established, and a three-fourths approval by the 
general membership.101  CHT also requires a procedure of notification before 
amendments can be presented to the membership.102 
In addition to general bylaw amendments, the process for amending the 
resale formula tends to include heightened procedural requirements.103  CHT 
requires a separate procedure for the amendment of resale-restriction 
formulas.104  First, any discussion pertaining to the amendment of the formula 
by the board of directors must be noted in advance with ten days notice to each 
director.105  Second, a motion to amend the formula can only be made after 
two-thirds of the board (quorum required) find that the current formula “may 
be detrimental to the mutually-held purposes of the Corporation, Its Members, 
lessees, and Covenantors.”106  Third, the board may propose and vote on a new 
formula, which must pass by two-thirds vote.107  Finally, once adopted by the 
board, the new formula must be presented to a special meeting of the general 
 
 98 See, e.g., Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. III–V. 
 99 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 5A, at 1–2. 
 100 Id. at 15–16. 
 101 Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. VII. 
 102 Id. (“[P]rovided that written notice setting forth the nature of the proposed change(s) shall have been 
given to all Members no later than two weeks prior to the meeting.  The notice must state that the purpose, or 
one of the purposes, of the meeting is to consider the proposed amendment and contain or be accompanied by 
a copy or summary of the amendment.”). 
 103 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 12, at 1. 
 104 These formulas are referred to as “limited appreciation formulas” in the CHT Bylaws.  Champlain 
Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. IX. 
 105 Id. art. IX § 2(a). 
 106 Id. § 2(b). 
 107 Id. § 2(c). 
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membership, and two-thirds of the members present (quorum required) must 
approve the formula for it to take effect.108 
Bylaw provisions like Article IX of the CHT Bylaws, which provides for 
the amendment of a resale formula, demonstrate the power that the board of 
directors can wield over the CLT’s affordability goals, and the detail of 
provision required to resist that possibility.  The board’s potential power 
pressures CLT organizers to carefully construct provisions outlining the 
composition and election of the board of directors.109  Although CLTs vary 
widely based on local need, the classic CLT model suggests a tripartite 
composition for the board of directors consisting of (1) Resident Members, or 
persons who occupy CLT housing;110 (2) General Members, or CLT members 
residing within the service area but not in CLT housing; and (3) “Public 
Representatives” nominated by the serving board of directors and intended to 
represent the public interest that may not already be represented by the General 
Member representatives.111  The composition of the board is intended to ensure 
representation of a wide variety of stakeholders in the CLT mission and to 
prevent a circumstance where a single “kind” of stakeholder dominates the 
decision-making process.112 
The U.S. Congress codified the classic CLT board of directors structure in 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 when it gave 
complying CLTs per se status as Community Housing Development 
Organizations (CHDOs).113  CHDO status renders CLTs eligible for federal 
Home Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) block grant funding, at least 
 
 108 Once passed, the new formula does not affect existing leases or agreements based on the old formula.  
Id. 
 109 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 5B, at 3–5. 
 110 Some CLTs that offer different varieties of residence, such as single-family residence, rental, or 
limited equity cooperative housing, allocate board seats in this section among the various types of CLT 
occupants.  Id. § 5B, at 4; see also, e.g., Champlain Housing Trust, Inc. Bylaws, art. III § 3. 
 111 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 5C, at 4. 
 112 Id. 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 12773(f) (2006).  The statute sets out a definition of “community land trust”: 
For purposes of this section, the term “community land trust” means a community housing 
development organization . . . . 
(5) whose board of directors— 
(A) includes a majority of members who are elected by the corporate membership; and 
(B) is composed of equal numbers of (i) lessees pursuant to paragraph (3)(B), (ii) corporate 
members who are not lessees, and (iii) any other category of persons described in the bylaws 
of the organization. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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15% of which must be given to CHDO organizations.114  The codification of 
the classic CLT board structure exemplifies a tension between local control 
and broader state regulation: now, if a CLT develops a different board structure 
that works better in its local context, the CLT sacrifices per se eligibility for 
CHDO status. 
CLTs use their operating documents to establish a structure within which 
they can anticipate and address adverse interests and tensions to ensure long-
term access to affordable housing.  These documents also state the CLT’s 
organizational purpose, which—although often tailored in anticipation of tax-
exempt status and funding eligibility115—records the mission of the CLT for 
posterity—arguably, its most important beneficiary. 
2. Structure of Legal Relationships 
In addition to its organizational structure, a CLT establishes its 
commitment to long-term affordable housing through the legal relationships it 
forms.  These relationships arise out of a series of documents and embody the 
classic CLT approaches to land, homeownership, property value, and 
community development. 
a. Split-Ownership as a Basic Method of Affordability 
The most basic element of the classic CLT model involves the splitting of 
ownership between the CLT and the homebuyer: the CLT holds title to land 
and sells structures located on the land.116  In the classic CLT model, the 
structure is a single-family home purchased by an income-qualified 
individual.117  However, CLTs apply the split-ownership model to multifamily 
residences, office buildings, and other scenarios where the party purchasing the 
structures is not an individual homebuyer.118  This ownership model appears in 
Congress’s definition of a CLT as described in the Housing and Community 
 
 114 24 C.F.R. § 92.300(a)(1) (2009). 
 115 See ICE (Third), supra note 87, §§ 3, 4, 6. 
 116 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. 
 117 Id. at 214–15. 
 118 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 2.  Unless otherwise specified, the reader may assume that this Comment 
treats CLT structures as units of housing. 
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Development Act of 1992.119  Thus, to qualify for the benefits of per se CHDO 
status, a CLT must offer this type of ownership structure.120 
The split-ownership structure relies on the transfer of a leasehold interest in 
the land from the CLT to the purchaser.  The parameters of the purchaser’s 
leasehold interest are governed by a ground lease.121  By splitting the 
ownership of the land and making the purchaser’s rights contingent on a 
ground lease, the CLT model sets up two important aspects of long-term 
affordability: (1) price reduction,122 and (2) the power to recapture the unit 
after the purchaser moves on.123  Combined, these two factors work to 
subsidize the cost of housing124 and maintain the possibility that the unit will 
perpetually serve the broader goal of long-term housing affordability. 
b. Ground Lease as an Instrument of Affordability 
The split-ownership model requires a document for governing the 
relationship between CLT as landowner and the purchaser as owner of the 
improvements.125  The CLT model uses a ground lease to define this 
relationship.126  Ground leases have been used for centuries in agricultural and 
commercial real estate transactions.127  CLT ground leases generally operate 
for a term of ninety-nine years and provide an option to renew.128 
The ground lease plays a central role in the functioning and long-term 
affordability of CLT housing.129  NCLTN circulates the ICE Model Ground 
Lease, drafted in 2002, as “a central document in the CLT movement.”130  
 
 119 42 U.S.C. § 12773(f) (2006). 
 120 This does not mean that CLTs cannot diversify their methods of housing stewardship by, for example, 
holding rights of repurchase in otherwise price-restricted units.  DAVIS, supra note 50, at 2. 
 121 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214.  The ground lease will be described in more detail in Part I.B.2.b. 
 122 Rosalind Greenstein & Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz, Community Land Trusts: Leasing Land for Affordable 
Housing, LAND LINES: NEWSLETTER OF THE LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, April 2005, at 8, available at 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1008_landlines final 4.05.pdf. 
 123 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. 
 124 The cost of housing is subsidized by removing the accruing value of the land from the equation.  
Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, supra note 122, at 9. 
 125 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. 
 126 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 18. 
 127 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. 
 128 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 2. 
 129 Id. 
 130 CLT Toolkit, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, http://www.cltnetwork.org/index. 
php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=111 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).  The Model Ground Lease is in a 
process of revision currently and is slated for release sometime in 2010, subject to approval by Fannie Mae.  
Id. 
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Many CLTs use this document as a template for their own ground lease, 
sometimes copying it to the word.131  Furthermore, Fannie Mae requires that 
CLT leases conform to the ICE Model Ground Lease to qualify for its 
mortgage products.132  For this reason, the bulk of this discussion draws from 
the ICE Model Ground Lease.133 
Like the bylaws, the ground lease establishes a lessee’s status as a regular 
voting member in the CLT.134  In providing that lessees are always voting 
members, the ground lease recognizes and protects a lessee’s interest in the 
operation of the CLT.135  While the bylaws can be amended by a sufficient 
vote of the membership,136 the material terms of the ground lease have the 
potential to operate for nearly 200 years.137  If a bylaw amendment were to 
conflict with terms in the ground lease, those terms would not apply unless the 
lessee specifically consented to their incorporation.138 
Through ground lease provisions, the classic CLT model establishes and 
enforces its most robust tactics to preserve affordability, including: resale 
restrictions;139 affordability limitations upon transfer;140 CLT options to 
repurchase;141 and limitations on use,142 assignment, and sublease.143  The 
ground lease also includes provisions to protect the lessee as a low-income 
homebuyer, such as granting the CLT the right to refuse the terms of a lessee’s 
mortgage.144 
 
 131 See, e.g., CMTY. HOUS. TRUST OF SARASOTA, GROUND LEASE (2005), http://www. 
burlingtonassociates.net/resources/archives/CHT%20Ground%20Lease.pdf. 
 132 FANNIE MAE, FORM 2100: COMMUNITY LAND TRUST GROUND LEASE RIDER (2006), available at 
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/forms/2100.jsp; see also discussion of Fannie Mae’s role in CLT 
homebuyer financing infra Part II.C. 
 133 The Model Ground Lease is set forth in section 12 of Community Land Trust Legal Manual.  See ICE 
(Second), supra note 91, § 12. 
 134 Id. § 12, at 16. 
 135 Of course, this does not prevent a majority of members from amending the bylaws to limit 
membership control, but it does guarantee that lessees will have the right to vote on such a decision. 
 136 See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 137 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 2. 
 138 Id. § 12, at 3. 
 139 Id. § 12, at 13. 
 140 Id. § 12, at 11. 
 141 Id. § 12, at 12. 
 142 Id. § 12, at 3. 
 143 Id. § 12, at 14. 
 144 Id. § 12, at 7.  The implications of the ground lease on mortgage options and vice versa is discussed in 
further detail in Part II. 
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Some of the ground lease terms are common aspects of a lessee–lessor 
relationship, which the CLT applies in service to its greater affordability goals.  
For example, as tenants under the ground lease, homebuyers must comply with 
a ground lease provision that limits the property’s use as a primary 
residence.145  The Model Ground Lease requires resident occupancy for a 
certain number of months, annually, as determined by the CLT.146  The ground 
lease also prohibits assignment or sublease without the CLT’s written 
approval.147  These provisions are intended to ensure that the lessee-
homeowner is using the property for its intended purpose, as opposed to 
renting it out at market rates that would undermine the CLT’s affordability.148 
The ground lease also establishes a base rent for the land, payable 
monthly.149  This rental amount covers the cost of CLT operations in 
maintaining the land and executing the ground lease, and may be influenced by 
state regulations.150  CLTs take great caution to make sure that the ground rent 
does not render the home unaffordable.151 
The ground lease also includes provisions that establish the CLT’s central 
role in the continuity of affordability from one homeowner to the next.  The 
lease provides that a homeowner must (1) allow the CLT first option to 
purchase back the home at the resale-restricted price,152 or (2) sell the home at 
the resale restricted price to an “income-qualified” individual.153  The ground 
lease further grants the CLT power of attorney to sell the property on behalf of 
the owner under certain circumstances.154  With the knowledge that they will 
have first option to purchase units back from lessees, CLTs can seek out and 
 
 145 Id. § 12, at 3. 
 146 Id.  For an example of this requirement in practice, see CMTY. HOUS. TRUST OF SARASOTA, supra note 
131, art. 4.4 (requiring ten months’ annual occupancy). 
 147 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 14. 
 148 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 215. 
 149 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 4. 
 150 See John Emmeus Davis et al., Building Better City-CLT Partnerships: A Program Manual for 
Municipalities and Community Land Trusts 77 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP08JD1, 
2007) (describing a Michigan State Housing Development Authority policy that requires all CLTs that the 
Authority funds to contribute at least $25 per month into a Capital Reserve Fund). 
 151 Id. § 13, at 5–6. 
 152 Id. § 12, at 12. 
 153 Transfers to specific heirs, such as children, are also allowed even if they are not income-qualified, but 
all other heirs must demonstrate income qualification to possess the premises.  Id. § 12, at 11–12. 
 154 Id. § 12, at 13 (granting power of attorney to the CLT when “[l]essee (a) is not then residing in the 
Improvements and (b) continues to hold the Improvements out for sale but is unable to locate a buyer and 
execute a binding purchase and sale agreement within one (1) year of the giving of the Intent to Sell 
Notice . . . .”). 
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prepare income-qualified buyers for placement on a waiting list.155  A waiting 
list can prevent the CLT from tying up its limited resources in the repurchase 
and holding of units.  The purchase option also allows the CLT to re-acquire 
the property and relegate it to other community needs, such as a common area 
or office space. 
One of the key features of the ground lease, and the source of much 
contention,156 is the resale formula.157  As a lessee, a homeowner promises 
that, upon selling her unit, the sale price will be limited according to a given 
formula.158  Resale formulas represent a “shared equity” aspect of the CLT 
arrangement.159  Shared equity is the process by which a CLT allocates the 
value and risk of owning property between itself (and therefore its 
beneficiaries) as lessor and the selling owner as lessee.160  The rationale behind 
resale formulas mirrors that described by the Dudley Street Neighborhood 
Initiative: increased property value arises out of both owner and community 
improvement, and should be allocated as such, especially when the 
unmitigated sale of the unit would price out existing community members.161  
While the specific formula differs from one CLT to another,162 it always places 
some limitation on the amount of equity the homeowner may receive, 
preserving affordability for future purchasers.163 
The resale formula is the fulcrum of the tension between durable 
affordability and individual wealth creation and can be calculated in various 
ways.164  Generally these formulas fall into four categories: appraisal-based 
formulas, indexed formulas, itemized formulas, and mortgage-based 
formulas.165  Appraisal-based formulas are the most common166 and are 
 
 155 See Davis et al., supra note 150, at 4 (describing one of the tasks of a CLT as making a waiting list of 
interested buyers). 
 156 See infra Part II. 
 157 Resale formulas are also sometimes referred to as “limited equity formulas” or “appreciation limitation 
formulas.”  ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 8, at 2. 
 158 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 13. 
 159 Another shared equity aspect of CLT homeownership is the split ownership of structure and land 
because the increasing value of the land remains in the hands of the CLT as titleholder and lessor.  See DAVIS, 
supra note 30, at 18–19. 
 160 Id. at 5. 
 161 See discussion of Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. 
 162 Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 29−32 (survey of resale formulas among CLTs 
nationwide revealed a wide variance in type and amount of resale formula). 
 163 DAVIS, supra note 30, at 18−19. 
 164 JACOBUS & LUBELL, supra note 10, at 10−11. 
 165 Id. 
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featured in the Model Ground Lease provided by the Institute for Community 
Economics.  These formulas compare the owner’s purchase price to an 
appraised fair market value of the property.  The positive margin between the 
two numbers, if there is one, is then divided between the selling homeowner 
and the unit itself.167  For example, if the formula allows for a 25% equity 
retention by the homeowner the following would apply: 
 
25% Appraisal-Based Resale Formula 
 
Year 1: Homeowner purchases CLT unit—$100,000 
Year 3: Homeowner seeks to sell unit—appraised at $140,000 
Increase in value: $40,000 
Resale Formula: .25(Increased Value) + Year 1 Price = Resale Price 
.25($40,000) + $100,000 = $110,000 Resale Price 
Homeowner’s positive value margin: $10,000 
Amount “retained” in property: $30,000 
Indexed formulas fix the rate of increase in the sale price to the rate of 
increase of a specified indexed value, such as the area median income (AMI) 
or the Consumer Price Index.168  Mortgage-based formulas derive the 
maximum sales price by choosing a target level of income, expressed as a 
percentage of AMI, and then working backwards from that income level to 
derive the maximum affordable price.169  Finally, itemized formulas determine 
the sales price by adding or subtracting specific amounts from the original 
price, such as the cost of improvements made to the property or an inflation 
factor.170  Each CLT must establish its resale formula balanced against the 
tension between the affordability goals of the CLT and the needs and 
limitations of its community, resulting in the wide spectrum of shared equity 
formulas that appear across the country.171  The formula is initially determined 
 
 166 In a recently conducted survey by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, fifty-one of ninety-four 
responding CLTs indicated that they use an appraisal-based formula.  Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra 
note 7, at 31–32.  Twenty-one responding CLTs use an indexed formula.  Id. 
 167 Id. at 31. 
 168 Id. at 32. 
 169 This price is based on an affordability factor of 33% of monthly income including taxes, interest, and 
insurance.  JACOBUS & SHERRIFF, supra note 68, at 24.  Only four CLTs responding to the Lincoln Institute 
survey reported that they used mortgage-based formulas.  Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 32. 
 170 Only three CLTs responded to the Lincoln Institute survey indicating that they use this method of 
calculation.  Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 32. 
 171 Id. at 30–32 (reporting appraisal-based resale formulas ranging 2%–60% of the equity allocated to the 
owner, with a median value of 25%). 
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by CLT organizers and members,172 and in the case of revision—which is an 
intentionally difficult process173—guided by the board of directors and 
approved by the voting membership.174  In the event that a CLT amends the 
resale formula, it only applies to existing ground leases if the lessee 
specifically agrees to the change.175 
3. Commitment to Affordability Established in Subsidy Retention 
The CLT model facilitates housing affordability and community 
development by getting the most mileage out of housing subsidies.  Typically, 
when a low-income individual seeks to purchase a home she has two options: 
traditional homebuyer assistance provided by state and federal programs like 
the Federal Housing Administration, or other subprime loan options available 
from private lenders.176  In recent years, lenders have offered “creative” 
mortgages and low-to-zero down payments to borrowers whose financial status 
and credit scores did not qualify them for traditional mortgage products.177  
However, the subprime crisis has underscored the risk—individual and 
systemic—involved in the unregulated promotion of these products.178 
On the other hand, traditional public homebuyer assistance aims to lower 
the cost of home purchases by offering grants or low-interest loans to 
individual homebuyers.179  These homebuyer assistance programs focus on 
affordable payment for the individual but fail to consider the affordability of 
the housing unit itself.180  To develop this distinction more fully: a plan that 
only aims to reduce a person’s monthly housing burden181 by providing 
subsidies that merely reduce that individual’s payment—such as a down 
payment grant or “soft second” mortgage—may not consider whether that 
subsidy is actually increasing the supply of affordable housing in the long 
 
 172 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 12, at 23–24. 
 173 Id. at 25–26. 
 174 See discussion of amended resale formulas, supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 175 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 12, at 26. 
 176 See Alan Mallach, Preface to DAVIS, supra note 30 (describing common strategies for low-income 
people to access homeownership).  See generally Sean Zielenbach, A Critical Analysis of Low-Income 
Homeownership Strategies, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 446 (2004) (discussing 
various low-income options for financing the purchase of a home). 
 177 DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED 69 (2009). 
 178 See id. at 3. 
 179 See JACOBUS & LUBELL, supra note 10, at 8. 
 180 Id. at 9–10. 
 181 Here, the discussion focuses primarily on homeownership programs to maintain a comparison between 
CLT durable affordability and other homebuyer assistance methods. 
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run.182  The subsidy merely makes an unaffordable property manageable—or 
even profitable—for one individual or family.183  Even when these programs 
involve some level of subsidy recapture,184 they do not necessarily pace the 
rising cost of homes, and end up requiring a greater investment after one low-
income homebuyer cycles through and a new one comes along.185  By focusing 
almost entirely on the cost of a home for each individual buyer, traditional 
homeownership assistance programs approach affordability as a problem that 
is income-generated—the homebuyers do not make enough money to play in 
the regular market.  The CLT model, however, adds nuance to the inquiry.  
While CLT homebuyers qualify based on their income, the model views 
“affordability” in terms of whether the price of the house is accessible—not 
whether the individual can be hoisted into affordability.186 
“Locking in” a subsidy involves keeping the price low and the unit 
perpetually available to future income-qualified persons.187  Funds devoted to 
the creation of CLT units are retained in the property itself, sustaining their 
value through multiple sales.188  For example, the Champlain Housing Trust 
(CHT) in Burlington, Vermont, completed a study of all government subsidy 
invested in CHT houses that had resold between the years of 1988 and 2008.189  
The results of the study showed that CHT was able to use subsidies of 152 
homes to help 357 families obtain CLT homeownership.190  The amount that 
this cost public coffers was five times less than it would have been if each 
subsidized homeowner had pocketed the subsidy upon sale.191  Interestingly, 
 
 182 See JACOBUS & LUBELL, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
 183 See Mallach, supra note 176 (“[W]here house prices are rapidly appreciating, publicly subsidized 
homeownership can lead to windfalls for a few, while other less fortunate lower income households are being 
pushed out of their own communities.”). 
 184 In a subsidy recapture program, the public subsidy must be paid back when the homebuyer resells the 
property.  JACOBUS & SHERRIFF, supra note 68, at 5–6. 
 185 Id. at 11–13. 
 186 See JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS & ALICE STOKES, CHAMPLAIN HOUS. TRUST, LANDS IN TRUST HOMES THAT 
LAST: A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE CHAMPLAIN HOUSING TRUST 21–27 (2009), available at 
http://www.champlainhousingtrust.org/assets/files/Lands-In-Trust_Homes-That-Last.pdf (measuring the 
preservation of affordability of Champlain Housing Trust homes by assessing the average resale price of the 
home against a household income of 50%–80% area median household income as compared to market rate 
Burlington housing). 
 187 RYAN SHERRIFF & JEFFREY LUBELL, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, WHAT’S IN A NAME?  CLARIFYING THE 
DIFFERENT FORMS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES OF “SHARED EQUITY” AND “SHARED APPRECIATION” 
HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAMS 20 (2009). 
 188 DAVIS & STOKES, supra note 186, at 27. 
 189 Id. at 27−30. 
 190 Id. at 29. 
 191 Id. at 30. 
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the study found only two instances where a public subsidy was lost in its 
entirety, and both cases involved foreclosure.192  Ninety-six percent of the time 
a CLT home changed hands, the home remained affordable enough that the 
purchase required zero increase in public investment.193 
II. FINANCING CLT HOMEBUYERS 
The CLT model shares at least one characteristic with nearly every other 
type of homeownership: the need for homebuyer financing.  While the CLT 
model subsidizes and locks in long-term affordability, buyers generally still 
need to borrow money to purchase the home.  Often, the very provisions that 
make CLT homes affordable complicate the lending relationship, making 
homebuyer financing one of the most widespread challenges for CLT 
growth.194 
Some lenders view the CLT structure as a credit asset because the CLT’s 
stewardship goals operate as a backstop in the event of a mortgage default.  
These lenders often work with CLTs to establish portfolios of CLT lending.195  
Most residential lenders, however, are unfamiliar with the ground lease 
structure and do not lend money to purchasers without a fee simple interest in 
the land.196  Furthermore, lenders are skeptical of the CLT ground lease 
because its terms will encumber the property even in the event of foreclosure.  
In an effort to remedy this hesitation, CLT advocates have worked with Fannie 
Mae to develop a method by which mortgages to CLT homebuyers could be 
mainstreamed.197  However, the fruits of these efforts, while they may 
encourage lenders to loan money to CLT homebuyers, jeopardize the fabric of 
the CLT model by threatening to strip the ground lease of its affordability 
provisions. 
After outlining these challenges, this Part argues that the risk of lending to 
CLT homebuyers is not as great as is perceived and should not be addressed by 
holding hostage the provisions that ensure the long-term affordability of the 
CLT model, especially in cases where CLTs have been subsidized with public 
resources.  Next, solutions are presented which propose stronger support of the 
 
 192 Id. at 29. 
 193 Id. 
 194 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 2. 
 195 Telephone Interview with Roger Lewis, Exec. Dir., NCLTN (Jan. 22, 2010). 
 196 Id. 
 197 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 8. 
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CLT model by government and quasi-government entities already charged 
with the duty to promote affordable homeownership. 
A. The Need for CLT Homebuyer Financing 
CLT homeowners are income-qualified individuals198—people who have 
typically stood at the margins of the housing market and therefore may be 
unfamiliar with lending practices.  As is the case with most homebuyers, 
income-qualified individuals do not have access to enough cash to complete 
their purchases.  They must acquire a mortgage.  The terms of their mortgage 
agreements will structure their payment schedules, directly impacting the 
affordability of their purchases and the stability of their tenure.  For this 
reason, and because some lenders have been known to take advantage of needy 
borrowers,199 CLT ground leases generally limit the kind of mortgage product 
that a homebuyer may solicit.200  In the wake of the recent housing crisis, this 
practice has been extolled as one of the most important elements of CLT 
survival and success.201 
Specifically, the ground lease stipulates that the CLT must approve any 
mortgage before the purchaser may agree to it.202  The CLT agrees to approve 
any mortgage that conforms to the Standard Permitted Mortgage (SPM) 
qualifications laid out in the ground lease.203  According to the Model Ground 
Lease, SPMs may only be granted to institutional lenders or Community 
Development Financial Institutions.204  SPMs must also be first liens on the 
property,205 and must grant the CLT the right to notice of a default in payment 
and the right to cure that default on behalf of the homebuyer.206  Because most 
 
 198 This category is typically defined as persons making between 50% and 80% of area median income.  
DEP’T. OF URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING, UNIV. OF WISC.—MADISON, A SURVEY OF NATIONWIDE 
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST RESALE FORMULAS AND GROUND LEASES 3 (2002), available at http://www. 
burlingtonassociates.com/resources/archives/ResaleFormulasandGroundLeases.pdf. 
 199 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Piling on Borrowers Buried by Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at 
BU1. 
 200 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 7 (discussing a “permitted mortgage”). 
 201 Fireside, supra note 17 (“Unlike shady mortgage brokers, ‘[CLTs are] not going to let people take 
risky mortgage products . . . .’”). 
 202 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 7. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. § 12, at 22. 
 205 Id.  In other words, without specific approval of the CLT, CLT homeowners may not seek second 
mortgages or otherwise encumber their property title. 
 206 Id. 
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residential mortgages do not contain these provisions,207 the CLT is able to 
review the lending documents of its purchasers to screen out possible predatory 
lending practices.208  This practice is not only good for the homebuyer, it also 
protects the CLT from the instability of having its residents teeter on the edge 
of financial ruin.  Providing stable, affordable homeownership is, after all, the 
primary organizational goal of most CLTs. 
B. The Difficulty of Finding a Lender 
In contrast to CLTs, which approach homeownership as an avenue for 
stable housing, lenders understand homeownership in terms of investment 
opportunity.  Homebuyers need to borrow money, and lenders provide that 
money at interest for the purpose of generating a profit.  If the homebuyer does 
not or cannot pay the lender back, the lender can resort to foreclosure and 
attempt to sell the house (and the lease to the land underneath it) to recover the 
amount due.209 
Just as CLTs are cautious of some mortgage products, lenders are skeptical 
of some aspects of the CLT model.  Although ground leases are quite common 
in commercial real estate transactions,210 the vast majority of residential 
mortgages are initiated on a fee interest in the land—not a leasehold interest.211  
Fortunately, some lenders are nonetheless willing to lend to CLT 
homebuyers.212  These lenders understand that lending to CLT homebuyers can 
be a secure investment because of the role of the CLT as a safety net.213  For 
 
 207 Not because the terms are problematic, but because most homebuyers do not have a local community 
organization offering to step in to cure financial defaults.  The most common security deed language can be 
found in each state’s Fannie Mae and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) Standard 
form.  See Security Instruments, EFANNIEMAE.COM, https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/ 
secinstruments/index.jsp (providing a list of standard forms for every state). 
 208 Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 373–74. 
 209 MARGE MISAK ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. LAND TRUST NETWORK, 2008 FORECLOSURE SURVEY 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.cltnetwork.org/doc_library/p238-2008%20CLT%20Network%20Foreclosure% 
20Survey%20Report%201009%20post.pdf.  NCLTN has recently conducted and published a 2010 foreclosure 
survey resulting in similar findings.  NCLTN worked with Vanderbilt University to produce a final report 
comparing the 2009 and 2010 surveys, and discussing the resilience of the CLT market against the prevailing 
dismal climate of the greater housing market.  EMILY THADEN, NAT’L CMTY. LAND TRUST NETWORK, 
OUTPERFORMING THE MARKET: MAKING SENSE OF LOW RATES OF DELINQUENCIES AND FORECLOSURES IN 
COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS (2010), available at http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction= 
Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=2173. 
 210 Owning a CLT Home, HOMESTEAD COMMUNITY LAND TRUST, http://www.homesteadclt.org/pdf/ 
OwningaCLThome.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
 211 Id. 
 212 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 1. 
 213 DAVIS & STOKES, supra note 186, at 6. 
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example, lenders are happy to agree to provisions that allow the CLT to cure 
mortgagor default.214 
Unfortunately, although those lenders who originate mortgages with CLT 
purchasers enjoy the security of CLT default protection, they do not find the 
ground lease’s affordability provisions as appealing.  While the ground lease is 
intentionally chosen by the CLT as a durable method of delivering 
permanently affordable housing,215 current demands of lenders threaten to 
unravel the very provisions that ensure affordability.  Because any mortgage 
obtained on the CLT property is necessarily subordinate to the ground lease, 
the terms of the ground lease continue to operate even after foreclosure. 
Lenders dislike provisions in the ground lease that could thwart their ability 
to recover their investment through foreclosure.216  In particular, they are wary 
of resale-restrictions and income-qualified buyer limitations.217  Incidentally, 
these are two of the CLT’s most powerful tools for ensuring the long-term 
affordability of the unit. 
Lenders view resale restrictions as threats to the value of their security.218  
If a buyer defaults in payment and the lender initiates foreclosure, lenders want 
to avoid any provisions that might hamper the property from selling for enough 
to cover the debt remaining on the mortgage.  This is not merely out of concern 
for their own solvency, but also is symptomatic of the demands of secondary 
mortgage market investors, who prefer assets that can be easily liquidated.219  
The CLT ground lease is senior to the loan and therefore survives foreclosure 
proceedings, limiting (1) how much the property may sell for220 and (2) to 
whom the property may be sold.221  If unmodified, the terms of the ground 
lease would apply to any foreclosure sale purchaser. 
Because the CLT model requires homebuyer financing, lenders occupy a 
position of tremendous bargaining power.  Evidence of this bargaining power 
 
 214 However, lenders are less likely to agree to provisions requiring them to notify CLTs in the event of 
default.  ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 4, 8. 
 215 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 221. 
 216 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 2. 
 217 Id. § 20, at 5. 
 218 Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 378–79. 
 219 Fannie Mae, for example, reports its assets in terms of the outstanding principal on its mortgages, 
indicating the amount that investors should recover either through payments or through foreclosure.  See, e.g., 
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 54 (Aug. 6, 2009). 
 220 ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 11. 
 221 Id. 
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can be found in section 8.3 of the Model Ground Lease, entitled “Removal of 
Certain Provisions Pursuant to Foreclosure.”222  This section provides that in 
the event of foreclosure or assignment of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, sections 
10.1–11 “shall be deleted and thereupon shall be of no further force or 
effect.”223  The deleted sections of the ground lease stipulate the terms by 
which the property may be transferred, including resale price formula, income 
qualifications for potential buyers, and the CLT’s right of first refusal—nearly 
every provision that ensures long-term affordability of CLT homes.  Quite 
obviously, a CLT would not choose to strip itself of these provisions 
unprompted.  In this way, lenders use their superior bargaining power to 
compel CLTs to shoulder any risk associated with CLT homebuyer financing.  
If the homebuyer does not pay back the loan, the CLT must sacrifice the future 
affordability of the unit. 
In addition to resale restrictions, prospective mortgagees fear the CLT’s 
termination rights under the ground lease.224  Although mortgagees could 
easily cure a lapsed ground rent payment, they have no easy way of curing the 
nonmonetary defaults of the lessee, such as ones requiring the use of the 
premises as a primary residence.  Although preferably the CLT would 
negotiate with the homeowner to address any violations, the underlying power 
of the lease grants the CLT legal right of termination if an agreement cannot be 
reached.225  For lenders this power threatens their interest in the property 
because termination of the ground lease can result in forfeiture of the unit to 
the CLT.226  In this way, lenders and CLTs find themselves in a bind: the CLT 
needs to be able to enforce the provisions of its lease, and the lender does not 
want the incurable behavior of the lessee to threaten its security. 
One solution that has been discussed would be to assign a monetary value 
to each nonmonetary default so that the lender could cure it.227  Another 
solution is to add a cross-default clause into the terms of the mortgage, which 
would equate default under the ground lease with default under the 
mortgage.228  These solutions address the related problems of CLT and lender 
 
 222 Id. § 12, at 8. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. § 12, at 15. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 216 (discussing ground lease termination due to default as a total 
forfeiture). 
 227 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 5.  Under the terms of most mortgages, when a lender incurs costs 
associated with its interest in a property, it is permitted to add this amount to the principal due on the loan. 
 228 See infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
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by merging the homebuyer’s duties as lessee with her duties as mortgagor.  
However, in doing so, homebuyer default under the ground lease becomes a 
liability under the mortgage.  Because of the ground lease-stripping provisions 
outlined in section 8.3, this liability either forces the CLT to bail out the 
borrower—and effectively pay for violations to its own ground lease—or it 
edges the homebuyer closer and closer to foreclosure—and the impending loss 
of long-term affordability provisions.  In other words, these “solutions” force 
the CLT to take on any and all risk associated with the homebuyer’s duties 
under both the ground lease and the mortgage.  Lenders, on the other hand, are 
in a position to either collect profit-generating interest from monthly payments 
or foreclose on the property and sell it at a price even the homebuyer would not 
have been able to realize.  In both cases, the lender or the foreclosure sale 
purchaser—often one and the same—appropriate public subsidies that would 
have otherwise been captured in the CLT model for the purpose of affordable 
homeownership.  Despite this apparent double standard, CLTs have 
consistently had to sacrifice crucial affordability provisions to ensure 
homebuyer financing.229 
C. The Fannie Mae Uniform Rider and the Secondary Mortgage Market 
Generally, lenders mitigate the financial risk of lending by ensuring that 
their loans conform to the standards set by government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) like Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”).  Chartered by the federal government, the GSEs purchase 
loans from lenders, securitize them, and sell them to investors on the secondary 
mortgage market.230  When they use GSE standard forms, lenders make their 
loans eligible for purchase should they need or choose to sell them to free up 
capital.231 
However, CLT homebuyers cannot use the standard mortgage forms 
because the terms of conforming mortgages do not account for ground lease 
provisions.232  Therefore, lenders cannot be certain that they will be able to sell 
the loan in the secondary mortgage market via Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  
 
 229 Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 378. 
 230 About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
 231 FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 21–24 (2009) (describing extra 
requirements and warrants that lenders must make to sell nonstandard documents to Fannie Mae), available at 
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/sg/pdf/sg1209.pdf. 
 232 See ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 8 (describing the purpose of the Fannie Mae Rider as a 
document necessary to provide conformity among CLT loans). 
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Without the standard forms, the GSEs would need to look at each loan 
individually before purchasing it—a time-consuming process that all but 
prevents purchase.233  Therefore, instead of mitigating the risk of lending to 
CLT homebuyers, GSE standardization creates a disincentive for lenders to 
work with CLT buyers. 
To alleviate this problem, CLT advocates from the Institute for Community 
Economics and NCLTN have worked to negotiate a method for standardizing 
CLT mortgages.234  As a result of these negotiations, in 2006 Fannie Mae 
announced that it would purchase CLT mortgages from lenders so long as the 
parties sign a Uniform Rider that certifies the approved uniformity of CLT 
mortgages.235  Essentially, the Rider bypasses the individual review process 
Fannie Mae would otherwise require,236 mitigating the risk of lending to a CLT 
homebuyer with increased liquidity in the secondary market. 
While the existence of the Rider may facilitate CLT homebuyer lending by 
mitigating the risk to lenders, the language of the Rider perpetuates the 
sacrifice of affordability provisions that has plagued the CLT lending process 
from the start.237  The Fannie Mae Rider institutionalizes the principle that if 
CLT homebuyers need to borrow money, then the CLT must shoulder the risk 
of borrower default by placing the ground lease—and long-term future 
affordability—on the chopping block. 
Fannie Mae’s Rider amends the ground lease for the period of time during 
which the mortgage remains outstanding.238  The Rider institutionalizes many 
of the provisions that individual lenders imposed upon CLTs.239  It also 
provides for ground lease enforcement by instituting a cross-default clause 
between the mortgage and the ground lease, as discussed earlier.240 
 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 06-03, PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO RESALE RESTRICTIONS OR LOCATED 
ON LAND OWNED BY COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS 10 (2006), available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/ 
guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2006/06-03.pdf. 
 236 Id. 
 237 See FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 4. 
 238 Id. at 1. 
 239 See discussion of lender-imposed changes to the ground lease supra notes 218–29 and accompanying 
text. 
 240 FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 5 (“A default by the Lessee under the Lease shall constitute a default 
under the Specified Mortgage.”). 
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However, what Fannie Mae gives in enforcement rights, it takes away in 
the event of foreclosure.  In the event that the Mortgagee acquires title to the 
property through foreclosure or assignment in lieu of foreclosure, the Rider 
states that: 
[A]ll provisions of the [Ground] Lease regarding (a) occupancy of the 
Leased Premises as a primary residence by the Lessee, (b) any 
limitation on the assignment of, or sublease under, the Lease, (c) any 
obligation to target certain populations in marketing the leasehold 
estate to potential transferees, (d) the price at which the leasehold 
estate may be transferred, and (e) the income of successive 
transferees, and their successors and assigns, shall be of no further 
force or effect with respect to such Specified Mortgagee or its 
successive transferees, assignees or successors.241 
This single provision strips five sections from the Model Ground Lease, each 
of which contains an important element of the CLT affordability model.242 
In exchange for the power to strip the ground lease of every provision that 
ensures continuous affordability, the Rider offers the CLT one major benefit: 
the option to redeem the home after foreclosure by purchasing it for the cost of 
the outstanding debt.243  However, this option is contingent upon the lender 
acquiring the property via foreclosure sale or assignment in lieu of 
foreclosure.244  If someone else purchases the property at foreclosure or if the 
CLT does not have the financial stability to purchase the property within the 
allotted time period, “the leasehold estate may be transferred, mortgaged and 
sublet an unlimited number of times, and the Lessor shall not require a credit 
review or impose other qualifying criteria on any such transferee, mortgagee or 
sublessee.”245 
 
 241 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 242 Upon foreclosure, the Rider strips the following provisions from the ground lease: Article 4, section 1 
(Residential Purposes) and possibly section 4 (Occupancy); Article 11 (Assignment and Sublease); and the 
following provisions of Article 10: 10.2 (Transfer to Income-Qualified Person), 10.6 (Lessor’s Purchase 
Option), and 10.10 (Resale Restriction).  In addition to these modifications, the Model Ground Lease, which 
Fannie Mae requires as a prerequisite to using its Rider, provides for the removal of Article 10 “Transfer Sale 
or Disposition of Improvements” entirely.  ICE (Second), supra note 91, § 12, at 8. 
 243 FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 3 (“Should the Lessor not choose to cure an Event of Default as 
specified above, the Lessor shall nevertheless have the option to purchase the leasehold estate from the 
Specified Mortgagee for [debt owed to Specified Mortgagee] as of the date of closing of the purchase . . . .”). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
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Although the Fannie Mae Rider might increase availability of credit for 
CLT purchasers,246 it has not mitigated many of the most crippling 
compromises that lenders impose on the CLT model.  By requiring the Rider, 
Fannie Mae is able to orchestrate changes in the ground lease that would 
otherwise take tremendous political will if attempted within the governing 
framework of the CLT.247  Outside of Fannie Mae’s Rider, other important 
government entities such as Freddie Mac or Rural Development do not have 
any uniform policy regarding CLTs.248  Furthermore, CLT homebuyers 
generally cannot access FHA-insured mortgages because FHA regulations are 
either incompatible with or have been interpreted to conflict with some CLT 
affordability mechanisms.249 
D. Against the Sacrifice of Ground Lease Affordability 
Federal and state housing and development programs serve as major 
funding sources for CLTs.250  The high rate of subsidy-recapture inherent in 
the CLT model251 can be a selling point for public funding.  When a CLT unit 
is sold in foreclosure and all affordability provisions are stripped from the 
ground lease, it can be bought and sold by anyone at any price.  The 
enterprising new homeowner—who has no formal commitment to the CLT and 
its affordability goals—effectively captures all previous federal, state, 
municipal, or community investment in the unit.  With the help of the Fannie 
Mae Rider, the foreclosure sale transforms a CLT unit from a bulwark of 
affordability into a publicly subsidized investment opportunity.252 
The affordability-stripping provisions outlined in the Rider impact the 
growth of the CLT movement nationwide.253  The CLT startup process 
 
 246 In actuality, the vast majority of CLT lenders have kept CLT mortgages in their portfolios instead of 
passing them downstream to Fannie Mae.  Telephone Interview with Roger Lewis, supra note 195. 
 247 Bylaws typically require a supermajority to amend the ground lease.  See supra notes 99–102. 
 248 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 10, at 4. 
 249 CLT Homeowners Access to FHA Insured Mortgages, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, 
http://www.cltnetwork.org/doc_library/CLT%20Homeowners%20Access%20to%20FHA%20Insured%20Mor
tgages%20051809.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
 250 See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 64 (discussing CLTs as developers and as property managers). 
 251 See discussion of public subsidy retention through the CLT model supra notes 182−93 and 
accompanying text. 
 252 The CLT Legal Manual offers a rosy spin to the “enterprising new homeowner” scenario by explaining 
that the ground lease provides for an increase in ground lease fees when the property is released from resale 
restrictions: “In situations where land values are high and the amount of the lease fee has previously been 
subsidized, the increase in revenue for the CLT can be substantial.”  ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 2, at 5. 
 253 Although the number of operating CLTs has increased significantly over the past decade, many CLTs 
remain inactive.  Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, supra note 7, at 7−11. 
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requires the proper alignment of community initiative, local support, financial 
backing, and resource availability.254  In order to protect its stewardship 
interest in its property, a CLT must maintain constant access to the financial 
resources necessary to redeem a unit from foreclosure.255  This is especially 
arduous for startup CLTs, which generally operate for three years before they 
can survive off of ground lease fees.256 
Lending interests, including GSEs like Fannie Mae, should not be so 
reticent in their approach to CLT lending: a CLT is a nonprofit community 
corporation that operates to ensure the long-term affordability of housing.  By 
the time it is negotiating for financing on behalf of a buyer or discussing 
uniform riders with Fannie Mae, its intentions and operations have long been 
vetted by the government.257  It may even have developed strong working 
relationships with a local municipality.258  Many CLTs have not only been 
granted tax-exempt status, but they have been dubbed CHDOs simply for 
being organized as a CLT, and are thus automatically eligible for federal 
funding under that title.259  The CLT is a mainstreamed entity acknowledged 
for its successful model,260 and yet it must compromise that model to negotiate 
financing for homebuyers, for fear that the collateral is not adequately 
standardized or substantially liquid. 
Meanwhile, the secondary mortgage market, including the GSEs, spent the 
last decade purchasing subprime loans from independent, unregulated lenders 
under terms that were all but certain to drive mortgagors into default.261  
Interestingly, the financial and social profiles of CLT buyers are not 
resoundingly different than those of their subprime mortgagor counterparts.  
 
 254 See DAVIS, supra note 50, at forward. 
 255 If the property goes into foreclosure and the CLT is unable to purchase it, the foreclosure sale 
purchaser is under no obligation to comply with any of the affordability requirements outlined in the ground 
lease.  However, the CLT is required to maintain a lessee–lessor relationship with the new homeowner. 
 256 CLT experts recommend that start-up CLTs secure three years of operational funding before they 
launch.  DAVIS, supra note 50, at 59. 
 257 See, e.g., ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 6, at 1 (discussing the vetting process for tax-exempt status, 
and other benefits that follow). 
 258 For a discussion of municipal involvement in CLTs, see Milne, supra note 22 (discussing the benefits 
and drawbacks of Limited Equity Cooperative and CLT cooperation with municipal governments). 
 259 See discussion of CLT per se CDHO status supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 260 Fireside, supra note 17 (discussing the Champlain Housing Trust’s recent international recognition for 
its affordable housing work). 
 261 David S. Hilzenrath, Fannie’s Perilous Pursuit of Subprime Loans, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2008, at 
D01. 
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Indeed, a prospective CLT buyer and a target subprime borrower generally fall 
within the same margin of the area median household income.262 
However, one major difference exists between subprime and CLT 
borrowers: a recent survey of CLT foreclosure statistics revealed that even in 
the midst of the current foreclosure crisis, CLT mortgages were six times less 
likely to be in foreclosure than any other mortgage—prime or subprime—
nationally.263  Similarly, the likelihood of default was far lower for loans 
secured by CLT properties.264  On December 31, 2008, only 1.4% of reported 
CLT mortgages were 90+ days delinquent, as compared to 3.74% of all prime 
loans, and 23.11% of all subprime loans, nationally.265  This statistical data 
reveals a tremendous gap between the perceived and actual risk of lending to 
CLT homebuyers.  These statistics also indicate that the CLT, which relies on 
conventional mortgage products, is a safe and effective way to encourage low-
income homeownership, and beckons greater institutional support—
government and otherwise. 
E. Eliminating Affordability-Stripping from the Fannie Mae Rider 
The CLT model offers sustainable affordability to low-income 
homebuyers, supports opportunities for below-market rental units,266 and 
simultaneously presents lenders with a relatively secure investment, as it has 
thrived during a period of record-high mortgage foreclosures.267  This 
resilience results from a series of organizational commitments and legal 
structures that define the CLT model—each of which is threatened by current 
lending practices.  While the Fannie Mae Rider standardizes CLT loans for 
sale on the secondary market, in doing so it institutionalizes the stripping of 
ground lease provisions that ensure long-term affordability and leaves public 
investment open to the possibility of private capture. 
This section argues that Fannie Mae should amend its Rider language to 
further the financing of CLT homes without undermining the long-term 
 
 262 Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 9, at 386. 
 263 MISAK ET AL., supra note 209, at 3–4. 
 264 Id. at 3. 
 265 Id. 
 266 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 267 Aaron Miripol, Colorado: Invest Wisely to Fix Real Estate Crisis, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 11, 
2008, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/aug/11/colorado-invest-wisely-fix-real-estate-crisis; 
Van Temple, What Foreclosure Crisis?  Community Land Trusts Offer Secure Homeownership, ROOFLINES 
(July 10, 2008), http://www.rooflines.org/1026/what_foreclosure_crisis_community_land_trusts_offer_ 
secure_homeownership. 
STEIN GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  12:02 PM 
246 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
viability of the model.  Fannie Mae has “an affirmative obligation to facilitate 
the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income  
families . . . .”268  It is supposed to fulfill this obligation “in a manner 
consistent with [its] overall public purposes, while maintaining a strong 
financial condition and a reasonable economic return . . . .”269  This language 
speaks to the important public purposes GSEs are intended to carry out. 
Unfortunately, literature produced by the CLT movement assumes the 
rather defeatist position that ground lease affordability stripping is a 
concession CLTs must make to provide affordable homeownership.270  From 
the CLT’s current bargaining position, this may be so, especially after CLT 
advocates spent years negotiating with Fannie Mae to produce the current 
Rider.  However, Fannie Mae already provides for the survival of resale 
restrictions for non-CLT properties—even ones that operate through ground 
leases.271  Fannie Mae, in its unique position as a GSE, can mitigate risk for 
lenders while simultaneously supporting the CLT commitment to long-term 
affordable homeownership.  To this end, this section proposes amendments to 
the Fannie Mae Rider that would allow resale restrictions and other 
affordability provisions to survive foreclosure and simultaneously buffer 
lenders’ risk. 
Removing affordability-stripping provisions from the Rider will not 
significantly increase the risk of lending to CLT homebuyers because they 
carry a disproportionally low repayment risk.272  Rider language that strips 
affordability provisions from the ground lease does so to increase the 
likelihood that the property will recover debt in foreclosure.273  But CLT 
mortgages are less likely to end up in foreclosure than their conventional 
counterparts.274  While individual lenders may choose to ignore this fact, 
Fannie Mae has a duty to facilitate lending for affordable housing.275 
 
 268 12 U.S.C. § 4501(7) (2006) (charging the GSEs with an affirmative obligation to further affordable 
homeownership). 
 269 Id. 
 270 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 5 (“CLTs, though they would prefer to see these restrictions 
retained, have generally recognized the need to accommodate mortgage lenders on this point.”). 
 271 When the resale restrictions survive foreclosure, the lender must “represent[] and warrant[] that the 
resale restrictions do not impair the servicer’s ability to foreclose on the restricted property.”  FANNIE MAE, 
supra note 132, at 4. 
 272 For example, CLT homebuyers have lower default rates than other borrowers on a nationwide basis.  
See MISAK ET AL., supra note 209. 
 273 ICE (Third), supra note 87, § 20, at 5. 
 274 See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 275 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (2006). 
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The Rider seems to have been crafted by simply replicating the 
affordability-stripping practices of profit-driven lending institutions, which 
have no chartered duty to promote affordable housing.  In doing so, Fannie 
Mae falls short of its public duty as a GSE.  In fact, the Rider language has a 
more detrimental effect on the CLT model than any individual lender’s 
decision to strip affordability provisions because it institutionalizes and 
nationalizes that practice.  Now, if a CLT were to convince a lender to finance 
homebuyers without modifying the ground lease, that lender would be unable 
to sell the loan to Fannie Mae.276 
While affordability stripping overstates the risks of ground lease resale 
restrictions, there are other risks of securing a mortgage with a leasehold estate 
that should be attended to.  Lenders justifiably fear termination of the ground 
lease, which, if unaddressed in the loan document, could result in forfeiture of 
the mortgage security.277  For this reason, it is appropriate to maintain Rider 
language that equates a default under the ground lease with a default on the 
mortgage.  With the removal of provisions that strip the ground lease of its 
signature affordability mechanisms, the cross-default clause benefits both the 
CLT and the lender by holding the borrower-lessee accountable without 
sacrificing the long-term affordability of the unit. 
Assuming that the actual risk of lending to CLT homebuyers is much lower 
than the perceived risk,278 state actors can easily change the landscape of CLT 
homebuyer financing by underwriting that risk without assuming tremendous 
liability.  Because many of the policies that control lending availability are 
discretionary, the changes proposed require surprisingly little political will.279  
The impact that GSE policy could have on CLT homeowner financing 
probably encouraged CLT advocates to approach Fannie Mae for a uniform 
policy to begin with.  However, it is now time to revisit the assumptions 
underlying Fannie Mae’s decision.  Amending the Rider language as 
 
 276 FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 10. 
 277 Abromowitz, supra note 8, at 214. 
 278 Again, this is indicated by the foreclosure statistics presented earlier, see supra text accompanying 
notes 263–65, as well as the fact that current methods for calculating financial risk have developed in an 
ownership paradigm that does not account for the CLT model, which prizes stewardship of affordable 
homeownership and land tenure. 
 279 Amending the Fannie Mae Rider is only one of many ways that federal policy could encourage 
financing that complements CLT long-term affordability goals.  Another proposed solution involves amending 
FHA regulations to ensure that CLT homebuyers are eligible for FHA homeowner insurance.  See NAT’L 
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST NETWORK, supra note 249 (suggesting material changes to FHA regulations 
governing the eligibility of nonprofit affordable housing programs).  FHA regulations generally also guide 
access to state FHA assistance, another counterintuitive source of resistance to CLT homebuyer support.  Id. 
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recommended should continue to mitigate lender risk by maintaining CLT loan 
access to the secondary mortgage market and by protecting lenders from total 
loss of security.  These proposed amendments use Fannie Mae’s involvement 
in the secondary mortgage market to bolster and support CLT homebuyer 
financing for low-income individuals, echoing the congressional findings that 
established Fannie Mae’s operational objectives.280 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment discussed the CLT model for creating and preserving 
affordable homeownership as it developed over the past four decades and as it 
operates currently.  The CLT model, although not the only viable model for 
affordable homeownership, operates innovatively within current legal 
structures to establish and enforce long-term affordable housing.  The model 
presents an efficient, resilient project for public investment. 
This Comment addressed the importance of mortgage financing to the CLT 
model of homeownership and described some of the challenges that CLT 
homebuyers face in securing loans.  So far, measures intended to increase CLT 
homebuyer credit access have required that CLTs concede to the stripping of 
long-term affordability provisions from their ground leases in the event of 
foreclosure.  Most notably, Fannie Mae—a GSE with the duty to support 
affordable homeownership—implemented such affordability-stripping 
practices in its required Uniform Rider. 
This Comment suggests that federal and state entities ought to begin 
affirmatively supporting the CLT model.  Specifically, it argues that Fannie 
Mae should amend its Rider to demonstrate confidence in the CLT model’s 
ability to offer affordable, sustainable homeownership to low-income 
individuals.  These amendments are not drastic changes, and they do not betray 
Fannie Mae’s corporate goals.  They also do not solve all of the problems that 
the CLT model faces.281  The amendments would, however, mark a change of 
course for the lending industry—a timely adjustment, in light of the most 
recent economic crisis.282 
 
 280 See discussion of Fannie Mae’s affirmative obligation to further affordable housing supra note 271 and 
accompanying text. 
 281 These changes do not address difficulties CLTs face when funding property acquisition or housing 
development, for example.  Nor do they address challenges that may arise out of state law, which governs 
contract and property claims. 
 282 For more on Fannie Mae’s role in the subprime mortgage crisis, see IMMERGLUCK, supra note 176. 
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Over the past four decades, a litany of federal regulations and programs 
have aimed to expand credit to underserved communities in an effort to 
increase homeownership across racial and class lines.283  Concurrent with these 
developments, CLTs fashioned a complementary strategy: a model for 
lowering the cost of homeownership entirely, reducing the amount of money 
homebuyers need to borrow.  These two approaches, far from incompatible, 
nonetheless find themselves at an impasse. 
In addition to the federal policies that incentivize low-income lending, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development requires that a certain 
percentage of Fannie Mae’s loan purchases consist of mortgages to low-
income individuals.  These kinds of policies ought to have mitigated the 
standoff between lenders and CLTs.284  Instead, these policies resulted in 
Fannie Mae expanding its investment in high-risk mortgage products,285 while 
simultaneously stripping affordability provisions out of CLT ground leases in 
the name of risk mitigation.  Ironically, today Fannie Mae rests in federal 
conservatorship, “unable to fulfill [its] mission of providing liquidity, stability, 
and affordability to the housing market[,]”286 while CLT borrowers enjoy the 
security of having default and foreclosure rates significantly below national 
averages.  Surely, the time for revision is upon us. 
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